



TELLING THE NATION: 
CURRENT AUSTRALIAN CONFIGURATIONS 
 
P. A. Gillen 
 
So natural is the habit of Australian self-analysis that its very quantity can 
easily become an occasion for further self-analysis. (Are Australians 
narcissistic?) There is no sign of a falling off. If anything, the number of 
books and articles seeking out, identifying or pondering the distinguishing 
features of Australian culture or the Australian people seems to be 
increasing. This essay discusses some recent examples, focusing on their 
underlying assumptions and motivations, and trying to put them into some 
kind of historical perspective. 
 
Who are we? What are we doing here? 
 
National character may be puzzling and contentious, an overworked domain 
of wild generalisation, prejudice and stereotyping. All the same, it is real 
enough. An Australian can pick a fellow national in a room full of people by 
the timbre of a vowel. And of course national features are not restricted to 
phonetics, they are all over that obscure object of desire called ‘culture’. 
Years ago in Crete I came across a group of young men and women 
frolicking in the water off a crowded beach. Even from the other side of the 
beach it was evident that they belonged to a different world from the 
German tourists on their beach chairs, who seemed grimly bemused by their 
antics. They were performing absurd charades of characters from Greek 




students of archaeology or classical literature. At any rate, they were of 
course Australian. Their vowels gave them away, but so did their attitude.  
 
On that occasion I felt relaxed and comfortable enough with my nationality. 
Nevertheless, the traits in play – ironic good humour, gauche insolence – are 
also ingredients of a prevalent negative stereotype. ‘We think’, a 
businessman from South East Asia once confided to me, ‘that Australians 
are loud, lazy and stupid’. He expressed surprised that my thirst for beer was 
measurably less than his own. Perhaps he would not have said these things 
to me, had I the look of someone whose ancestors came from somewhere in 
Asia. 
 
In the flood of words about what it means to be Australian, it is rare to find 
any quite as blunt as ‘loud, lazy and stupid’. However, much agonised self-
appraisal goes on. Moralism dominates the genre. Perhaps that is why the 
portrait is so messy. Apparently Australians are conformist and independent, 
easy-going and selfish, egalitarian and prejudiced, arrogant and insecure. 
They combine nostalgia for the ideological and institutional relics of Britain 
with nationalist insularity. 
 
Isolation, landscape and colonialism are repeatedly invoked as explanations 
of Australian character and identity. Australians live far from the rest of the 
world. Back of their dwelling places, which are nearly all close to the sea, 
lurks a vast, sparsely populated country. The land, ‘our’ land, is a rich and 
contradictory symbol of past achievement, future potential, indigenous 
dispossession, and precious, endangered nature. It seems harsh to most 




live. Harsh – and dangerous. Contorted by heat and drought, flattened by 
wind and flood, its soils leached of nutrients, it is ‘old’ not merely 
geologically, but in the spiritual impression it makes. Out there are hunger 
and thirst, poisonous creatures, maddening loneliness. The bush resists 
domestication. Children disappear into it. At the same time, wherever they 
live, white as well as indigenous Australians have strong attachments to 
Australian places, as Peter Reade’s evocate work Belonging insists.i Their 
relationship with their dwelling places partakes of what Martin Heidegger in 
his high-flown language described as the fourfold oneness of dwelling: it is 
here that Australians save the earth, receive the sky, await the divinities, and 
initiate their being.ii 
 
British colonists, thrust from a Europe replete with art and strife, 
indifferently shoved aside the indigenous people and proceeded to 
investigate, settle, and make money. Their descendants, together with the 
non-British, mostly white immigrants who joined them, have never really 
worked out what it means to be congregating on the edges of a forbidding 
land far from their ancestral homes, but they know it has to mean something. 
For the key to the secret they look towards the continent’s ‘dead heart’, 
away from the sea that brought them here. As Laurie Duggan observes, the 
bush is constructed or imagined as an ‘authentic’ space, an image of the true 
nation, ‘populated by “authentic” national types’.iii 
 
All of which is an old mantra: 
 





 A woman beyond her change of life, a breast 
 Still tender but within the womb is dry… 
 The river of her immense stupidity 
  
 Floods her monotonous tribes from Cairns to Perth… 
 And her five cities, like five teeming sores 
 Each drains her, a vast parasite robber-state 
 Where second-hand Europeans pullulate 
 Timidly on the edge of alien shores. 
 
 Yet there are some like me turn gladly home 
 From the lush jungle of modern thought, to find 
 The Arabian desert of the human mind, 
 Hoping, if still from the deserts prophets come, 
 
 Such savage and scarlet as no green hills dare 
 Springs in that waste, some spirit which escapes 
 The learned doubt, the chatter of cultured apes 
 Which is called civilisation over there.iv 
 
Not long before A. D. Hope published this poem in 1939, P. R. Stephensen 
published the first major work about ‘Australian culture’—though 
significantly he did not use this phrase, preferring the formulation ‘culture in 
Australia’.v Stephensen took it for granted that nations are by and large a 
product of their geography and the genetic make-up of their people. 
Australia is the way it is because of where it is and who its people are. Both 




of Aboriginal, and a vast, wild continent to admire and tame. While 
believing in race as a determinant of national character, Stephensen judged 
place to be more important. Had not the landscape painting of Gruner, 
Hilder, Heysen, and Streeton discovered a 'Spirit of Place’ that was 'an 
Australian contribution to the art of the world’?vi Once they outgrew their 
British heritage, the national character of Australians would come to match 
the matchless character of the Australian landscape.  
 
The British Connection 
 
Today, the brutal fact of colonisation commands more attention than the 
where and who. Nevertheless, the where and the who are crucial. For 
example, the tie with Britain remains stubbornly robust. It is sixty years 
since Brian Penton, then editor of the Sydney Daily Telegraph, wrote a 
polemic (Think, Or Be Damned!) in which he complained that Australian 
Conservatives had failed to move beyond conceiving of Australia as a 
British colony, and the Left had failed to provide an acceptable alternative.vii 
He blamed these failures on the lack of tough-minded pragmatism observed 
by the historian W. K. Hancock. Hancock (who in 1930 saw no problem 
using the word ‘invasion’ to describe the arrival of the Europeans) judged 
that ‘as individuals, Australians are generally matter-of-fact people who 
distrust fine phrases and understand hard realities. But in politics they are 
incurably romantic’.viii 
 
Not much has changed. In 1999, Inga Clendinnen, whose reputation rests 
chiefly on expertise in the history of pre-Columbian Central America and a 




was asked to give the Boyer Lectures, a prestigious ABC annual radio series 
modelled on the BBC’s Reith Lectures. Clendinnen’s lectures were 
broadcast shortly before a referendum in which the majority of Australians 
voted to retain the British monarch as the nominal head of their national 
state. She pitched into the arguments that accompanied the rise of Pauline 
Hanson and the One Nation Party in the late 1990s. A splendid teller of 
stories, she told moving and evocative ones about Aboriginal dispossession. 
Yet when Clendinnen was moved to offer her listeners a list of things that 
she liked about Australia, it turned out that many of them—Common Law, 
popularly elected parliaments, the celebration of Armistice or Anzac Day – 
were directly inherited from the dispossessors, and furthermore mostly 
continue to be understood that way, as a colonial legacy. (Even Anzac day 
celebrates the part played by Australians in a British war.)  
 
Yet Clendinnen’s list of Good Australian Things juxtaposed these accolades 
for British institutions with praise for behaviour that is not obviously British, 
and might even be thought obviously not British. She liked being called 
‘mate’, thought Australian teachers and nurses ‘humane and inventive’, and 
was impressed that at Melbourne’s Austin Liver Transplant Unit, ‘no one 
can jump the queue’.x  
 
Australian egalitarianism has a curious, dynamic relationship with the 
tenacious attachment to Britain. The nation’s origins were profoundly 
ambivalent. It was eighteenth century Britain’s ‘Pacific solution’, a dumping 
ground for criminals and dissidents expelled from their homeland, a 
collection of remote detention centre where violations of human rights were 




impulse, as a humane and socially beneficial alternative to appalling prison 
rates and conditions in Britain. From the first, the Australian continent was 
both a prison and a land of promise, where people came because they 
rejected their homeland and wanted somewhere better, or because they 
hoped, Magwitch–like, to take back a fortune. The relative dilapidation of 
British social status markers—accent, dress, schools, aristocratic titles—
simultaneously signified Australian inferiority, and the enlargement of 
egalitarian and entrepreneurial elements in British society. So being 
Australian could imply both aspiring but failing to be properly British, and 
correcting and superseding Britain by not aspiring to be British. This is what 
psychologists call a double bind. A cybernetic encyclopaedia remarks that 
‘the effect of a double bind is that the addressee cannot decide what is real 
and may develop pathologies’.xi 
 
The complement of Australia’s complicated relationship with Britain is its 
equally curious relationship with the other English-speaking great power, the 
United States. This is the subject of Don Watson’s mordant essay Rabbit 
Syndrome, the rabbit referring to Harry Angstrom, the gormless subject of 
John Updike’s Rabbit novels. A. D. Hope accused Australians of being 
second-hand Europeans. To Don Watson’s jaded eyes, we have become 
second-hand Americans. xii But the British tie remains more salient in 
institutional terms. 
 
Marching to Tolerance and Back 
 
David Walker’s Anxious Nation is a review of Australians’ attitudes to Asia 




example of contemporary historiography, examining a great diversity of 
source materials from academic literature to novels, memoirs, journalism 
and government reports. From them emerges a kaleidoscopic pattern 
illustrative of typical Australian ‘ways of seeing Asia’. The pattern is a 
picture of pictures, a ‘meta-picture’, patchy, inconsistent and blurred, 
because that is the nature of national ways of seeing. (In similar vein, Laurie 
Duggan’s study of the visual arts in the first decades of the twentieth century 
refers to a ‘ghost nation… in a visual sense of images which ghost each 
other; not as layers or levels but as a kind of parallax view which must exist 
in any slice of time, whose images shift about (against) each other within 
time…’xiv) Walker’s method relies on premises that are difficult to 
evaluate—the representativeness of its evidence, the validity of its 
interpretations – but this is true of all history. He uncovers a rich brew of 
attitudes to Asia during this formative period of the Australian nation, all 
shared with other ‘white’ nations. Denigration, fear and ignorance dominate 
but do not obliterate simple curiosity, commercial opportunism, sincere 
admiration, and fanciful orientalism.  
 
Walker observes that ‘the modern city, with its urban complexity, crowds, 
noise and chaos mirrored the conflicted genetic condition of the “half-
caste”… City-dwellers were routinely denigrated as voluble, devious, 
unreliable, degenerate. Cities were thought to encourage far too much 
mixing and mingling; too much talk, invention and experiment… The city 
was seen as the site of racial betrayal. In contrast, rural folk were solid, 
dependably stable, patriotic. Only they were true nation-building material.'.xv 
Do cities foster tolerance? The inhabitants of large cities like Sydney and 




behaving in less predictable ways than their country cousins, whether the 
latter are imagined (falsely, always falsely) as living in Rousseauan moral 
purity or in Marxian rural idiocy. Urbanites may not be more tolerant, but 
they are more exposed to difference, and probably likely to be more blasé 
about it. However, there is very little in contemporary Australia that is either 
truly urban or truly rural, in the traditional meanings of those words. The 
typical built environment is the suburb, a compromise between city and 
country about which Robert Graves once remarked that ‘hell is the suburbs 
of itself’. Quite a few Australian intellectuals have agreed with him, but in 
this they have been out of step with the majority of their compatriots.  
 
Anxious Nation could be read as a parable of the futility of power. It surveys 
decades when there was all but total domination of the world by white men. 
Yet many were obsessed with the prospect of the imminent decline and ruin 
of their ‘race’, and what the Harvard historian Lothrop Stoddard called in 
1921 ‘the rising tide of colour’. In terms of their own value system, 
subsequent events justified their anxiety. European Empires really were 
nearing the end of their centuries-long supremacy, or at least a profound 
change in its character, and people of colour were indeed on the way up. 
 
Tony Burke's passionate and detailed history of Australia’s political and 
military relationships with Asian countries complements and confirms 
Walker’s study.xvi More heavily theorised, Burke’s analysis is based on a 
Foucauldian understanding of security as a ‘political technology’.xvii In spite 
of the abandonment of the White Australia policy and the rhetoric of a new 




its repressive relation to the Other’, and continues to dominate Australia's 
relationships with the region to the present day.xviii  
 
Burke and Walker illustrate forcefully how, within living memory, opinions 
and assumptions that today would be perceived as obnoxious were not only 
expressed publicly, but were taken for granted by most people. According to 
one view, the national story, at least after World War II, is a journey leading 
steadily from a past of prejudice and intolerance towards a happy future of 
live and let live. For three decades or more – from perhaps the early nineteen 
sixties until at least the mid nineties – this inspirational narrative prevailed 
among those whose business it is to ponder such things (politicians, 
journalists, teachers, ‘the educated public’). It was closely associated with 
and conditioned by government policies. In the 1960s, the political 
discrimination against Aborigines mandated by the Constitution was 
removed, and a bipartisan consensus in the Federal Parliament led to 
dismantling of barriers to non-white immigration. (Subsequently 
considerable numbers came from the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and 
people with some kind of Asian descent now comprise about 5% of the 
population.) The goal of ‘assimilating’ Aborigines was officially ditched in 
favour of a friendlier, if not necessarily more feasible, goal of ‘integration’, 
and an internationally acclaimed policy of ‘multiculturalism’ extended a 
similar courtesy to immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds. 
Many developments, some perhaps quite separate, added support to the 
‘journey to tolerance’ narrative. They included equal pay for women, the 
introduction of no-fault divorce legislation and a weakening of the legal and 
social significance of legal marriage and legitimacy, legalisation of 




generally, the relaxation of a once repressive censorship regime, easing of 
restrictions on gambling and alcohol consumption, more casual etiquette and 
dress codes, and more.  
 
In these terms, ‘tolerance’ undoubtedly made ground during the thirty years 
of integration and multiculturalism. However, there was always resistance to 
it. The Mining Industry conducted a heavy-handed campaign in 1984 against 
Aboriginal Land Rights legislation proposed by the Labor Party, which 
succeeded in putting off the issue until the Mabo Judgement compelled 
action nine years later. This was also the period of a bitter debate about 
Asian immigration, triggered by Geoffrey Blainey’s public doubts about the 
wisdom of multiculturalism.xix During the nineteen eighties there was a 
constant grumble of anti-Asian racism—graffiti, street attacks, community 
groups protesting the building of mosques and Buddhist temples, and so 
forth. However, the depth of feeling about race and migration issues did not 
become not fully clear until the election of the Howard government in 1996, 
when it received a degree of official license. Interestingly, these days it is 
not so often directed against immigrants from East and Southeast Asia, who 
have melded with the dominant culture with relative ease and speed, as 
against Muslim immigrants from the Middle East. Today nearly all the 
institutional and cultural elements of multiculturalism remain in place, but 
they are on the defensive, and multicultural rhetoric has been erased from 
political bandwagons as thoroughly as the name of a dumped candidate. For 
the first time in decades, coding policies and messages to appeal to the 
racially prejudiced voters – playing the so-called ‘race card’ –is a recurrent, 





The same trends—restrictive immigration policies, less inclusive attitudes to 
cultural difference, along with a partial return to a closer government 
regulation of lifestyle choices—can be observed throughout the West in 
recent years. One common explanation ascribes them to the renewed vigour 
of global capital and economic liberalism, resulting in rapid structural 
change, market turbulence, high levels of unemployment, widening 
inequalities, and a weakening of the welfare state.xx Other factors may 
include massive population growth in poor countries, fostering resentment, 
religious fundamentalism, and sheer desperation, and aging populations in 
rich ones, nudging them towards conservatism. 
 
Yet regardless of the global context, intolerance in Australia is also 
Australian intolerance. The 1998 Boyer lecturer, eminent novelist David 
Malouf, addressed the issue of national civility. His lectures, ‘The Making of 
Australian Consciousness’ (published as A Spirit of Play), contrasted two 
factors at work in Australia’s cultural history: isolation, conformity and 
repression, which Malouf abhorred, and diversity, creativity and 
imagination, which he applauded.xxi Malouf’s schema of an ongoing tension 
between the (possibly dangerous) delights of play, and the (sometimes cruel) 
demands of loyalty, touches the reality of debates about ethnic crime and 
imprisonment rates, land rights, substance abuse, family violence, refugees, 
detention centres, and so on.  
 
Malouf implies that Australians would be happier if they cultivated the spirit 
of childhood within them, but Peter Pierce’s lugubrious inquiry suggests that 
Australian childhood is an anxious state, menaced by mythical as well as 




of the lost child in Australian culture. Surveying news reports, novels, 
paintings and films, Pierce concludes that Australians are morbidly 
preoccupied with the dangers that threaten childhood. In an argument 
blending academic erudition, literary grace and moral zeal, he finds that 
nineteenth century stories of children manifest a fear of the land, whereas 
stories from the second half of the twentieth century represent the threat no 
longer as coming from the land itself, but from people in it: kidnappers, 
molesters, Welfare Officers. 
 
In the early months of 2002, Australia seemed to be awash with 
stories about endangered children, starting at the top. The federal 
government was embroiled in two rather bizarre commotions 
connected with children. There was accumulating evidence that the 
government had consciously promoted misinformation during the 
2001 election campaign by claiming that would-be immigrants threw 
their children overboard from a vessel in the Timor Sea in order to 
blackmail an Australian rescue ship into picking them up. At the same 
time the Governor-General was facing down calls for his resignation 
after it emerged that he had failed to act on cases of child abuse within 
his diocese when Anglican Archbishop of Brisbane. Meanwhile, 
cinema goers could see Rachel Perkin’s short musical film One Night 
The Moon: an early twentieth century farmer’s daughter dies in the 
bush because he refuses to employ an Aboriginal tracker.xxii Then 
there was Rabbit Proof Fence, based on Doris Pilkington’s biography 
of her mother.xxiii Three girls taken from their mothers under Western 
Australian Aboriginal Welfare legislation escape from the convent 




their way home by following the white man’s useless rabbit proof 
fence through hundreds of kilometres of sublime outback. The result 
is an engaging work that manages to confront the issue of the stolen 
generations with a degree of honesty, without straying too far into 
polemic and out of commercial viability. Thanks in large part to their 
depiction of landscape, both films make a vivid impression. The 
children in them bear symbols in beautifully contrasting structural 
symmetry. In one, a white child, drawn from ‘civilisation’ (by the full 
moon), dies in the outback for lack of a black rescuer to bring her 
home; in the other, black children, fleeing from ‘civilisation’, survive 
in the outback despite efforts by white rescuers to prevent them going 
home. Although in Rabbit Proof Fence the implication is complicated 
by the metaphor of the fence, which is the work of the conquerors but 
guides the lost indigenous children home, nevertheless at some deep 
level both films encode a message that is unconvincingly simple: 
whites are lost in the outback, Aborigines are not. That is only half 
true. If it were wholly true, whitefellas could not make so much 
trouble there. 
 
The symbolic and emotional weight of Australian tales of endangered 
children tends to support Pierce’s thesis, but without comparative 
investigation, whether or not Australians are more anxious about the young 
than other nationalities remains an open question. People everywhere tell all 
sorts of tales about children, but not everyone considers it to be a national 
issue. Pierce claims that the figure of the lost child registers a deep flaw in 
Australian identity, directly related to ‘essential if never fully resolved 




places they might not belong bruised anxieties not only over legitimacy of 
land tenure, but of European Australians’ spiritual and psychological 
lodgement’. Australians are ‘a people persistently fearful of where we are 
lodged in space and time’.xxiv This interpretation is plausible for the period 
from the late nineteenth century to the present. David Walker makes a 
closely related point when he remarks that popular narratives of Asian 
invasion from the early decades of the last century manifest ‘a fear that 
Australia’s historically shallow and remote colonies might not be given long 
enough to establish coherent identities’.xxv However, it is doubtful that many 
earlier colonists had such qualms, even the dissidents celebrated by Henry 
Reynolds.xxvi They were taught that to possess rights over land by virtue of 
having fought for it was not only legitimate, but praiseworthy above all other 
means. That was how God urged the Chosen People to inherit the Promised 
Land, how the Romans built their Empire, and how the Normans founded 
the state that became Great Britain. In colonising Australia, the British were 
doing no more than following in the glorious footsteps of their exemplars 
and ancestors.  
 
While Walker, Burke and Pierce agree that anxiety and fear haunt Australian 
identity, Rosamund Dalziell finds it tainted by shame. Although her book 
begins with the story of a young shoplifter being paraded around a Canberra 
store wearing a t-shirt that reads ‘I am a thief’, for Dalziell the core of shame 
is not doing a bad thing but being a bad thing, having what the sociologist 
Erving Goffman in a classic study calls a ‘spoiled identity’.xxvii She discusses 
Australian autobiographies under four headings, according to the shames 
they register. There is the shame, once potent but today barely pertinent, of 




and colonial provincialism – the kind of shame familiar to students of 
Australian literature as the ‘cultural cringe’ denounced half a century ago by 
A. A. Phillips.xxviii There are the shames of being Aboriginal, or descended 
from non-English speaking immigrants. Perhaps the most symptomatic of 
the Australian shames examined by Dalziell is having unmarried, absent or 
dead parents.xxix Endorsing what Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra term 
Australia’s ‘bastard complex’, according to which Australians are engaged 
on a ‘doomed quest for symbolic forms of legitimacy’, she notes a literal 
correlate of bastardry in the extremely high illegitimacy rates of the early 
decades of convict settlement.xxx ‘Bastard’ remains a common term of both 
abuse and solidarity in Australia, a linguistic move typical of stigmatised 
groups, as the self-application of ‘nigger’, ‘chick’ ‘blackfella’ and so on 
attests. 
 
Jennifer Rutherford’s The Gauche Intruder psychoanalyses Australian 
culture. It is a stimulating work of philosophical and literary panache. Like 
Pierce and Don Watson (and Patrick White), Rutherford detects an 
underlying nihilism in Australian white culture, ‘an encounter with the 
void’.xxxi Influenced by Lacan and Zizek, she argues that racism is founded 
on a fantasy of goodness and enjoyment, a fantasy that must be protected 
and so entails reactive aggression. She calls the fantasy ‘the Australian 
Good.’ It is cognate to Burke's 'security’, but the strength of Rutherford’s 
analysis stems from how she puts her finger on the impervious righteousness 
of the intolerant, worn like armour against the possibility of doubt. Her case 
is framed by Lacan’s formulation of the fraught nature of ‘moral’ goodness 
as opposed to ‘ethical’ reflection. The trouble is, this takes the form of a 




nations). Rutherford does not clarify its relationship to the specifics of white 
Australian identity. Does every nation have a ‘Good’? What distinguishes 
the ‘Australian Good’ from Others’ Goods? If the road to hell is paved with 
good intentions everywhere, what is special about Australia’s good 
intentions and Australia’s hell? I wanted The Gauche Intruder to move 
outward, towards history and the world of nations, but it moves inward, and 
then not even into minds of real people, but into figures of literary fiction – 
the fictions of Henry Handel Richardson, David Malouf and Tim Winton. It 
is uncertain whether most Australians have even heard of these writers, and 
it is for sure that only a small proportion has read them. To be fair, there is 
more to Rutherford than this, as Ordinary People, her recently released 
documentary on One Nation members, shows.xxxii However, The Gauche 
Intruder is burdened with the same problems that encumber the more 
traditional and eclectic studies of Pierce and Dalziell. Its interpretations of 
Australian identity and culture may be plausible, even compelling, but it 
lacks means to confirm them, and fails to make the comparisons with other 
nationalities that would bring them down to earth.  
 
Reflecting on the rise of the Australian film and television industries in the 
1970s, Don Watson sums up the tenor of these more recent discussions: 
‘lurking behind our self-confidence was anxiety and shame’.xxxiii Mungo 
MacCallum is one of the few present-day commentators to resist pessimism 
about the Australian character. His essay on the Tampa crisis and the cruel 
system of detention by which the Australian government has sought to 
discourage unauthorised immigration, maintains that Australians ‘remain 
tolerant and easy-going about race – if their politicians give them half a 




Australians are indeed tolerant about race, then they are also so easy-going 
about it (not to say stupid) as to be misled with implausible ease by the 
politicians they elect. Sociologists have long been aware of the currents of 
racism and white supremacism in Australia, trenchantly demonstrated by 
Ghasan Hage.xxxv 
 
Saying sorry and making it better 
 
Recent self-portraits, then, represent Australians as uncomfortably stuck 
with elements of British colonialism, prey to intolerance and racism, 
harbouring fear, shame and insecurity, and deeply nihilistic. They fear many 
things, including shame, and they are ashamed of many things, including 
fear. They need help. True all of this may be, but it amounts to an 
indictment, not a description or an analysis, and omits some of the national 
type’s most recognisable (and endearing) features. These authors say little or 
nothing about the open friendliness for which Australians are renowned, nor 
its corollary, brashness. They do not dwell on the laconic wit noticed by 
many, whether interpreted as grounded wisdom or crass stupidity. Where, in 
other words, is Crocodile Dundee? 
 
In view of their tone of censure and lament rather than praise and 
celebration, it is striking how polite most of the recent national 
commentaries are. Their demeanour tends to resemble that of a teacher 
struggling to motivate a recalcitrant class, or a mediator intent on resolving a 
complex dispute. Though often motivated by strong moral or political 
convictions, they strain to conciliate, persuade and compromise, and make 




Howard for ‘bad history’,xxxvi Inga Clendinnen, as if encouraging the 
weakest pupils in a class, praised One Nation supporters’ ‘egalitarianism and 
obstinately independent empiricism’.xxxvii If any were listening, they must 
have been chuffed. Even Don Watson, who has written scripts for Max 
Gillies and Paul Keating, manages to keep his indubitably sharp tongue on a 
leash most of the time in Rabbit Syndrome. The tone modulates between 
irony and elegy, though anger and despair are just below the surface and 
occasionally spill out in brief outbursts that for me are slightly too like the 
climax of a Methodist sermon to take altogether seriously. Younger 
dissidents like Fiona Nicoll also write well-mannered books. From Diggers 
to Drag Queens is a discussion of the representation of war in Australian 
nationalism, based on research on the Australian War memorial and the 
historian C E W Bean. Rejecting the narrative of a national journey towards 
tolerance, she celebrates the politics of parody. Her favourite example, the 
drag satire of Simon Hunt alias Pauline Pantsdown, is an excellent 
illustration of Malouf’s ‘spirit of play’. At the same time Nicoll appeals 
earnestly across the rabbit-proof fences of the culture wars. ‘Violent 
diatribes against digger-nationalism too easily reproduce the configuration 
of national identity they seek to displace’, she warns. ‘Hanson and 
Pantsdown are related elements of a single phenomenon’.xxxviii  
 
In the first half of the twentieth century, violent diatribes about the nation 
were par for the course. Denunciation, sarcasm and harangue were approved 
modes of public intervention. The Foundations of Culture in Australia is a 
strong brew by the standards to which we have become accustomed. 
Expatriate intellectuals are dismissed as ‘shirkers, they have cleared out, 




want something easier”’.xxxix The intellectuals who stayed at home fared no 
better. They had retreated into ‘castles of isolation... retreating from the 
Australian problem, leaving the petty and the smug in control of things of 
the mind here... How can these timorous shirkers be awakened to a sense of 
their national duties and responsibilities?’xl Stephensen’s critics were equally 
rude to him. Randolph Hughes, an acolyte of Christopher Brennan’s who 
fled Australia as soon as he could, described Culture in Australia as a ‘funny 
elucubration... clumsily conceived and barbarously written; it is the product 
of a mind that is muddled and ill-furnished’.xli 
 
Penton’s polemic is in the long tradition of British literary bombast, 
darkened by the urgency of total war. The mood is of a pub, noisy with male 
shouting, as the closing hour of six o’clock approaches and arguments 
threaten to become punch-ups. Attacking the abstractions of political debate, 
Penton called for and exemplified ‘ill-mannered, cantankerous, unpatriotic, 
subversive and destructive thought’.xlii True, his self-proclaimed faith in 
‘clear thought’ was disingenuous. When it came to making constructive 
suggestions, Penton picked up his hat. All the same, the dulling down of 
Australian debate is regrettable. Mark Davis is one of the few to keep the 
tradition alive.xliii Did Paul Keating sing the sparkling swansong of public 
pugnacity? It is thirty years since intellectuals excelled mightily in rhetorical 
truculence: the young Germaine Greer, for instance, or Mungo MacCallum 
in his Nation Review period. Girt by Sea shows that MacCallum has lost 
none of his acuteness or lucidity, but his wit has lost its sting. He used to 
exemplify Penton’s ‘ill-mannered, cantankerous, unpatriotic, subversive and 
destructive thought’. Now he secretes the disappointment of the sizeable 




symbol of their political disorientation. The man they hated, the one who 
felled Whitlam, has turned out to be one of their own. Eppur si muove. 
 
In a persuasive commentary, David Carter contends that today’s public 
intellectuals are driven by the values of literary aestheticism.xliv Their 
favoured genre is the intimate, didactic essay invented by Montaigne. (Ken 
Wark, a prolific national commentator with a professed admiration for the 
sixteenth century moralist, made the point by citing Lyotard: Montaigne is a 
‘postmodern’ writer’xlv) The literary essay is a genre that parades modesty 
but is motivated by an ample sense of self-importance. The goal of a 
national commentator, like Montaigne’s, is therapeutic. He or she would like 
to make their audience better people. But while Montaigne was content to 
work his charm on individual readers, Australia’s public intellectuals want to 
work theirs on the entire nation. It seems these critics must love their nation, 
or why be so concerned about it? But their love is not the bountiful love of 
those who devote their lives to uplifting of their fellow citizens, like Arthur 
Stace, whose chalked ‘Eternity’ decorated the streets of Sydney for decades 
and who is saluted in the title of the Australian National Museum’s most 
popular permanent exhibit;xlvi or a current denizen of the same city who 
wanders its streets cheerfully wishing everyone he meets a happy day, 
assuring them that they are beautiful and Jesus loves them. Nor is the love of 
today’s commentators the angry love of the Hebrew prophets, denouncing 
and excoriating the sins of the people. Their love is low-key and domestic. It 
is protective of self and bound by proprieties. By turns it carps, seduces, 





The personal anecdote is a stock-in-trade of the essay genre, as the 
beginning of this one illustrates, so it is not surprising that by far the most 
favoured tool in the current kit of national psyche mending strategies is the 
telling of stories. Dalziell urges that writing autobiographical accounts of 
shame helps to resolve its pain, while reading them evokes sympathy.xlvii The 
Gauche Intruder is sprinkled with anecdotes and interludes. Fiona Nicoll 
also makes rich use of narrative, folding an historical account of the 
Australian commemoration of war into other levels of stories—national 
myths, the current political situation, the author herself, and the writing of 
her book. Pierce is convinced we can ease the burden of our sense of 
dislodgment if we ‘illumine’ how it happened by ‘the rehearsal of stories’. 
Indeed, he insists that stories ‘must be addressed as a matter of moral and 
cultural urgency. An inquiry into them can enrich us all’.xlviii  
 
Clendinnen cites the liberal philosopher Martha Nussbaum in favour of her 
belief that telling ‘true stories’ restores political health to a community (that 
‘true’ apparently intended to rule out the stories of John Howard). By 
promoting critical self-examination and empathy with others, stories foster 
responsible citizenship and enhance citizens’ ability to foresee the likely 
consequences of different courses of action.xlix It is certainly the case that 
communities need stories to sustain and recreate themselves. They provide 
frameworks that help people to know who they are, where they come from, 
and where they are going. However, as Clendinnen is perfectly aware, 
stories can also foster unquenchable grief, monstrous indifference, and 
murderous rage. She maintains that histories that do this are not ‘true’. But 
what is truth’? In practice, people are persuaded not so much by truth as by 




Of course immigrant and Aboriginal testimony has been an important factor 
in promoting understanding and reconciliation?l Yet there is something 
unsettling about the claim that these stories cause reconciliation. Rather, the 
writing of such testimony, the demand for it, the imposition of it through 
marketing, school curricula etc, and the ways in which it is received and 
interpreted, are all aspects of reconciliation. If it were not so, the testimony 
would not be written, or published, or read; or if by some chance it were 
written and published and read, it would not arouse sympathy and guilt, but 
pride, satisfaction, and at best cool pity. Stories may be necessary if we are 
to become better than we are, but they are not sufficient. 
Is the current prioritising of narrative a symptom of a postmodern loss of 
faith in abstraction and rationality? Those who are moved to pass judgement 
on the state of the nation differ greatly in their attitudes to postmodernism as 
a philosophical or aesthetic movement. Nevertheless, their discursive 
strategies surely reflect postmodern developments: the dominance of visual 
and interactive mass media, proliferating cultural diversity, the growth of the 
knowledge industries, and a condition in which, in John Frow’s words, ‘high 
culture… is no longer “the dominant Culture” but is rather a pocket within 
commodity culture’.li Today’s readers receive much of their knowledge from 
audio-visual micro-narratives and bland textbooks. Writers can take little for 
granted about their beliefs, values and assumptions, and straight talk can go 
badly astray. Speaking in parables is a good way to go, especially if you 
want to reach non-specialist readers. 
 





Integration and multiculturalism are modern in that they imply a decoupling 
of national from ethnic identity. What binds Australians together is no 
longer British heritage or racial origin (Father of Federation Henry Parkes’ 
‘crimson thread of kinship’), but a social contract to achieve a common 
future. In adopting these slogans, Australia acknowledged itself, as the 
United States did from its beginning, to be an artefact of the thoughts and 
desires of human beings. (The Australian Constitution, like the American, 
begins with an evocation of ‘the people’, but unlike its revolutionary 
predecessor refers to them as peoples of the federating states rather than the 
nation as a whole, and then adds Almighty God, the British Crown, and the 
Constitution itself, as further sources of the nation’s legitimacy.)  
 
In the speech he read for the 1988 Bicentennial, the then Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke asked: 
 
What is it that links us, in our generation, with the generations 
which have gone before? It is not only the fact that, for the past 
200 years, and to this day, we have been a nation of immigrants. It 
is not only the fact that we share together this vast continent as our 
homeland. It is not only the shared inheritance of all that has been 
built here, and achieved here, over the past 200 years. And it is not 
only the common bond of institutions, standards, language and 
culture. Indeed, in today’s Australia, our very diversity is an ever-
growing source of the richness, vitality and strength of our 
community. It is true that all these things I have mentioned go to 
shape the Australian character and define the Australian identity. 




the question: Who is an Australian? And that factor is: a 
commitment to Australia and its future.lii 
 
The point is reiterated, corrected and extended with typical flair by Mungo 
MacCallum, who declares that the first boat people arrived 40,000 years 
ago.liii This concept of the nation is sometimes called ‘postmodern’,liv but it 
is modern in its fervent orientation to the future and confidence in the power 
of conscious self-transformation. It is almost as if the Nietzschean ideal of 
the ‘artist-philosopher-hero’lv were projected onto the whole nation, 
imagined as committed to creating and transcending itself in accordance 
with Zarathustran imperatives: 
 
I teach you the Superman. Man is something that is to be 
surpassed. What have ye done to surpass man?lvi 
 
Duggan’s Ghost Nation is concerned with this relationship between 
Australian nationality and the strenuous imperatives of modernity. His topic 
is ‘visual culture’, broadly defined, but in practice mostly referring to art and 
architecture, and the focus is on the naming, imagining and organizing of 
space as fundamental attributes of national consciousness. The period is the 
four decades from Federation until the eve of the Second World War. Rather 
arbitrarily, Duggan confines himself to Sydney (with an excursion over the 
Dividing Range for a quick tour of Canberra) and avoids the impact of the 
1914-1918 war. The latter he dismisses as something that ‘occurred 
elsewhere as a structuring myth whose importance grew as the event 
receded’.lvii Obviously he is thinking of the visual arts, not the fierce 




of the male population. Even so, the omission is curious. Duggan interprets 
his period in terms of a local registration of modernist aesthetics, while 
noting that at the time artistic modernism was experienced as much as an 
imported novelty as a local form of expression. Neither was it a unified 
movement. (80) At the time is seemed like a series of controversies about 
new artists and movements that often had little in common and sometimes 
disagreed with one another strongly. Along with insightful discussions of 
Grace Cossington-Smith, May Gibbs, Walker Burley-Griffin and Margaret 
Preston, there is consideration of the Lindsays, who hated modernism but are 
correctly acknowledged as an integral part of the scene. 
 
Ghost Nation is not quite as good as the sum of its parts. Reading it is rather 
like being taken round an art gallery by an erudite enthusiast. Duggan 
expounds eloquently on each topic, but where he is going is a question 
endlessly deferred. If there is a leading theme, it is the figure of the city 
evoked by Walter Benjamin, the phantasmagoria of built structures and 
people at the heart of modernist experience, productive of ‘almost 
hallucinatory awareness’. Town planners seek to write national agendas 
upon the city’s confusion (its ‘half-caste’ condition, in Walker’s terms), 
using spatial design to squeeze out danger and unpredictability, and instil 
order, productivity and collectivity. (91f) Duggan’s illuminating discussion 
of the building of Canberra concludes that it ‘has become finally an ironic 
capital in which the idealism of its design coexists with the practical 
inconvenience of its pragmatic location. It is a city that looks like a suburb’. 
(171) Rutherford, however, finds more eeriness than irony in the national 
capital. Reflecting that Canberra was designed to be looked at not lived in, 




becomes constitutive of the experience of living in Canberra; it becomes 
itself an idealised state, and identification with this ideal enters into the 
circuit of jouissance and its defence… There is something uncannily familiar 
about Canberra’s empty streets’.lviii In his biography of Paul Keating, Don 
Watson adds a nice counterpoint, describing Parliament House, at the 
intersection of the city’s main grid lines, as follows: ‘Inside it wants for 
nothing except reality. It smells of nothing, tastes of nothing, and is the 
colour of nothing. Having no past and no provenance, it evokes nothing, 
unless it is the end of history.’lix 
 
Duggan observes that ‘“Official Australia” was the product of modernity, 
and yet its spokesmen rejected modernism’.lx Hence the great interest of a 
moment when this broadly true generalisation broke down spectacularly. 
This moment is the subject of The Prime Minister’s Christmas Card, 
Lindsay Barrett’s incisive essay on modernism and the Whitlam 
government. In 1973 the National Gallery provoked a scandal by spending 
$1.34 million on the abstract expressionist Blue Poles, painted by a 
foreigner, the American Jackson Pollock. In response, Whitlam defiantly 
reproduced the painting on his Christmas greeting card. Barrett observes that 
‘unlike any Australian politician before him, Whitlam had firm opinions on 
both art and sewerage, and he was equally passionate about both’.lxi With his 
fabled eclecticism and eloquence, Whitlam embodied two utopian Australian 
dreams of development, one of which was waning in the 1970s, the other 
waxing. On the one hand there was the dream that beckoned most insistently 
in the first half of the twentieth century, of a nation made rich, populous and 
powerful though economic development. On the other hand, there was the 




century, of a nation made urbane, tolerant, egalitarian and green through 
cultural development.lxii Today the first dream has faded to a shadow of its 




In the last quarter of the twentieth century subtle but noteworthy changes 
occurred in the ways that nation, nationality and nationalism were 
understood and discussed. There was a worldwide tendency to conceptualise 
nationality less as a function of group membership, and more as the function 
of an authentic personal ‘identity’. Over the same period, however, the 
concepts were theorised by academics in ways that were somewhat 
dissonant with the wider trend. The dominant theoretical paradigms of 
nationality came to understand it as a function of structures and forces that 
are historical and contingent. 
 
National issues that few decades ago were assumed to be about action, are 
today more likely to be problematised as issues of identity. Donald Horne, 
for example, finds the possibility that there might be no credible definition 
of Australian identity ‘disturbing’. He is led to propose a ‘no bullshit’, 
‘testable’ one that appears to claim that an Australian is a liberal-minded 
global citizen who speaks English. This odd turn at least makes it clear that 
it is not identity he is talking about, but moral sensibility and political 
preference.lxiii Contrast Horne’s approach with Brian Penton’s, who in 1941 
was not interested in Australians asking themselves who they were, but 
urged them to decide what they should do. The ‘disagreeable question’ that 




continuing existence?’lxiv Nor is there anxious questioning of the nature of 
Australian identity in Stephensen's book. The sine qua non of nationality is 
change and becoming, not identity and being. Australians are not inventing 
Australia. Australia is inventing us. Eventually it will ‘produce a new variety 
of the human species’, since Australia ‘is a unique country. All countries are 
unique, but this one particularly so’.lxv The shift in emphasis from becoming 
to being has been accompanied by related shifts from behaviour and motives 
to representations and attitudes. Being Australian used to refer largely to 
what Australians did or were likely to do. These days it is more likely to 
refer to what they think, or are likely to think. Nationality is treated 
primarily as a function of typical imagery and narratives, and only 
secondarily of dispositions to behave in typical ways. It is tempting to date 
these changes from the 1960s, when, according to Richard White, the 
expression ‘the Australian Way of Life’ began to fall into disuse.lxvi The 
phrase’s disappearance can be interpreted as a sign of the replacement of 
‘assimilation’ by ‘integration’ – that is, there can be more than one 
Australian ‘way of life’. As well, it implies that how Australians live—what 
they do—is less significant than what they are or could be.  
 
Although bitter nationalist struggles continue, during the 1990s there were 
growing signs of a retreat from identity politics generally, including national 
politics based on identity. Fiona Nicoll reflects the trend, taking her cue 
from Queer Theory. She claims her work to be part of ‘a broader 
epistemological reorientation that is taking place in Australian cultural 
studies away from the question of who we are towards the questions of 
where and for what it is that we stand’. For Nicoll, the enhancement of ‘self-




transformation.lxvii Rutherford proposes that national identity reveals itself in 
‘unexpected’ repetitions and commonalities across the field of Australian 
culture,lxviii implying that nationality is a statistical entity, a fuzzy set of 
behavioural attributes. That is how a linguist might define a speech idiom.  
 
The artificiality of nation states has always been an aspect of Marxist 
thought, but by 1983, with the appearance of Ernest Gellner’s Nations and 
Nationalism and Benedict Anderson’s Imaginary Communities, the idea was 
becoming orthodox.lxix Nation states, with their diverse sentiments and 
institutions, were modelled as a creative response to modernity – to 
capitalism, literacy, industrial technology and European colonialism. 
Richard White’s influential book Inventing Australia (1981) was an early 
working out of this view. White argued that the quest for national self-
definition is futile, and focussed instead on the image-makers who have told 
Australians who they were.lxx Guided by them, the ‘archetypal Australian’ 
underwent rapid metamorphosis in the twentieth century, becoming in turn 
the ‘white happy and wholesome’ youth of the new federation, the beautiful 
crucified male bodies of Gallipoli diggers, the bearers of a ‘true Europe’ 
upholding values abandoned by decadent Europe and crass America, etc.  
 
That nations are built on sand is not a new insight. The nineteenth century 
writers and intellectuals who played a key role in the development of 
nationalist thought were frequently conscious of it. They gave it a wholly 
different meaning to White. ‘Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say 
historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation’, Ernest Renan 
wrote in 1882. ‘The nations are not something eternal. They had their 




do not exist, but that nations are like ‘ancestor cults’ whose continued 
existence is ‘a daily plebiscite’. National unity stems from people ‘having 
suffered, enjoyed, and hoped together’. ‘To have common glories in the past 
and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds 
together, to wish to perform still more – these are the essential conditions for 
being a people’.lxxi A character in John Buchan’s popular spy thriller The 
Thirty Nine Steps (1913), published on the eve of a nationalist bloodbath, 
advances the idea with breezy clarity: ‘If you’re going to be killed you 
invent some kind of flag and country to fight for, and if you survive you get 
to love the thing’.lxxii  
 
Far from finding something to love at the end of his search for Australia, 
Richard White claimed to find nothing at all; a discovery which, 
inadvertently or not, echoes Patrick White’s theme of Australian nihilism. 
‘From the attempts of others to get there, we can learn much about the 
travellers and the journey, but nothing about the destination itself. There is 
none’.lxxiii Australia is no more than all the representations of Australia. It is 
an unconvincing conclusion, like deciding that an onion cannot be a proper 
vegetable because there is nothing at its centre. Renan and Buchan, on the 
other hand, accept the more commonsense view that being wrapped around 
nothing is what makes an onion the sort of vegetable it is. Actually, 
Inventing Australia does preserve something of Australia over and above 
manufactured images, in the form of a trace of Marxian superstructure. 
National images are interpreted as masks for the interests of the rich and 
powerful, mediated by a compromised intelligentsia. However, by the 1990s, 
with the influence of Derrida and the fading of even gestural Marxism, the 




and Narration (1990), Homi Bhabha, while not confronting directly the 
suggestion that nationalism masks ‘interests’, whether of a ruling class, state 
apparatus or popular utopianism, looked instead to its narrative aesthetics 
and ‘the Janus-faced ambivalence of language itself in the construction of 
the Janus-faced discourse of the nation’.lxxiv When everything has many 
faces, ‘mask’ tends to lose meaning. 
 
The idea that nations are somehow illusory, rhetorical, imagined, invented, 
made or constructed, has a powerful appeal in Australia. Just how powerful 
is evident from the titles of books published in the past decade or so: ‘The 
Making of Australian Consciousness’, ‘Ghost Nation: Imagined Space’, 
‘Making Australia’, ‘Making it National’, ‘Images of Australia’, ‘Illusions 
of Identity’, ‘Mistaken Identity’, ‘Reinventing Australia’,lxxv and so on. 
Australians are reminded more often than most other citizens of the fractured 
and provisional character of their nationality. Not only are there the still 
unresolved ties with Britain, but there are also strong attachments to the 
regions, which have legal and administrative support because Australia is a 
federation. Geographical diversity and distance amplify the distinctive 
features of the States, and high rates of demographic mobility increase 
awareness of them. Very few scholars indeed undertake studies of, for 
instance, New South Welsh or Tasmanian identity, analysing the psyches of 
these sub-nations, pondering the meaning of their social statistics, attributing 
their collective attitudes to ‘fear of the Other’ and so forth. Nevertheless, the 
histories and cultures of the federating States are unique, and there is still 
significant separatist sentiment in the North and West. The States are also 
reminders of the historical relativity of the Australian nation: Western 




In an alternative universe not radically different from the one we inhabit, the 
people who are now New Zealanders or Fijians might have been Australians. 
After all, as British Pacific colonies they sent delegates to some of the 
Conventions that preceded federation. Lastly, and perhaps most strikingly, 
Anzac Day, which clearly surpasses Australia Day as the nation’s most 
sacred civic ritual, is shared with another nation.  
However, the recognition that in a profound sense nations are artificial, runs 
up against the equally strong concern to discover authentic Australian 
identity, to discover the heart of the onion and know ‘who we really are’. 
Logically, it is difficult to know what authentic Australian identity can be if 
Australia is something people make up as they go along. In response to this 
dilemma, an awkward compromise is frequently embarked on. The 
‘imagining’ of the nation is reinvested with moral value. As in: Australians 
created Australia, and it is good, so we are good. Or: we created Australia, 
and it is not much good, but we can make it better, because we are good. As 
John Rickard puts it, ‘the uncertainty of the future offers the opportunity to 
invent one’.lxxvi That sort of rhetoric, which seems to be incumbent on 
politicians, is, if not, in Hancock’s words, ‘incurably romantic’, then 




Barrett explains the failure of Whitlamism as the result of a failure to grasp 
adequately the nature of the world beyond Australian shores. ‘It was a 
conceptually and practically impossible way of dealing with the effects of 
extreme international change within the social, economic and political life of 




continue to proliferate. Who knows, APEC might develop into Pacific 
Common Market, and then a Pacific Community, and being Australian may 
become something similar to being a Tasmanian or a Sydneysider. Or if, as 
seems rather more likely at this ominous point in history, the world 
continues to coagulate into increasingly antagonistic enclaves, nationality 
may become even more significant and pressing. In any case, what it means 
to be Australian will certainly continue to change. 
Saving his highest note till last, Watson suggests, in a frame of mind 
delicately poised between sarcasm and despondency, that it would be better 
for Australia to become American than to be America’s deputy. ‘The 
cultural cringe ends the day we join’. lxxviii He lists the advantages – military, 
economic, and cultural. I was delighted with this. I have been espousing the 
idea for years. At dinner parties threatened with cosiness or ennui, it is a 
splendid way to provoke the eye rolling and lip curling responses. With the 
typical blindness of national sentiment, Australians obstinately fail to see the 
obvious. A few years ago, liking to live dangerously, I asked students in a 
lecture whether they would prefer Australia to be part of Indonesia or the 
United States. An overwhelming majority preferred Indonesia. This could be 
read in any number of ways, but none of them indicate any likelihood that 
Australia will soon become the fifty first state, or that the Australian states 
will become states of the American Union. Watson of course knows it is not 
a practical idea. Yet such is his disillusionment that he seriously wonders if 
the Australian republic, espoused so passionately by the former Labor Prime 
Minister and opposed so obstinately by the present one, is really a good idea. 
Might the result not be a phobic, narrow-minded ‘Fortress Australia’? For a 
nation of rabbits, sticking with a queer second-hand monarchy could be best 




to the present circumstances, even if we wake up one morning to find 
Charles and Camilla on our throne’.lxxix  
 
It is the way we seem to be going, but it’s pretty weird. If the options are a 
fairytale of European royalty or membership of the USA, the USA makes a 
lot more sense – assuming they would have us. If Australians were US 
citizens, there is no doubt that Southeast Asian businessmen would still 
think us loud, and probably stupid, but they would hesitate to call us lazy. 
Lazy is not an adjective that is meaningful with respect to Americans. It 
would not even fit Australian Americans. 
 
------ 
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